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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge.  
 
Those who serve in the military must also balance 
civilian life, including time away from a civilian job. To help 
servicemembers strike that balance, Congress enacted the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act of 1994 (“USERRA”). Gerard Travers appeals the 
dismissal of his lawsuit alleging that USERRA requires 
employers like FedEx to pay reservists for short-term military 
leave. We conclude the best reading of USERRA directs 
employers to provide the benefit of compensation when they 
choose to pay other employees for comparable forms of leave. 





Travers served in the United States Navy and the Naval 
Reserve. He also works for FedEx and fulfilled his Reserve 
duties during leaves from work. Travers received no 
compensation from FedEx for those absences because the 
company does not pay employees for military leave. But 
FedEx does pay employees who miss work for other reasons, 
like jury duty, illness, and bereavement, to name a few. 
Relying on USERRA, Travers challenged FedEx’s decision. 
The District Court dismissed Travers’s complaint, concluding 
that paid leave was not a “right and benefit” under USERRA. 
Travers now appeals.1  
 
 
 1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the 
USERRA claims under 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review the dismissal of Travers’s USERRA claim de novo. 
Gordon v. Wawa, 388 F.3d 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1384 (3d Cir. 1994)). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We “consider only those facts 
alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as 
true.” Gordon, 388 F.3d at 81 (quoting ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, 





 USERRA is one of several statutes benefitting veterans. 
Our limited task: “interpret the words consistent with their 
‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the 
statute[,]’” as that is the “fundamental canon of statutory 
construction.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 
2070, 2074 (2018) (first alteration in original) (quoting Perrin 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). We “begin and end 
our inquiry with the text.” Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity 
Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017). Of course, “the 
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Parker Drilling 
Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019) (quoting 
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)). So 
we reach for our “toolkit” containing “the standard tools of 
interpretation” needed to consider the text, structure, and 
history of the law. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–15 
(2019); Parker Drilling, 139 S. Ct. at 1892 (“[T]he standard we 
adopt today is supported by the statute’s text, structure, and 
history, as well as our precedents.”). Doing so allows us to 
determine the best ordinary reading of the statute. United 
States v. Smukler, 991 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2021). Tools in 
hand, we begin by considering how USERRA defines the 
benefits Congress provides to working servicemembers.  
 
A. USERRA’s Protected Benefits 
 
 1. The Statutory History 
 
With American participation in the Second World War 
looming, Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service 
Act of 1940 (“STSA”) requiring all men between the ages of 
6 
 
twenty-one and thirty-six to register for military duty. Pub. L. 
No. 783, 54 Stat. 885. The first peacetime draft law in the 
nation’s history,2 the STSA protected the jobs of those who 
would soon join the Allied powers overseas.3 Id. § 8(b), (c), 54 
Stat. at 890. Along with requiring employers to restore veterans 
“to a position of like seniority, status, and pay,” id. § 8(b), 54 
Stat. at 890, the STSA allowed veterans to take military leave 
and entitled them to “insurance or other benefits offered by the 
employer . . . at the time such person was inducted into such 
forces[.]” Id. § 8(c), 54 Stat. at 890. In these ways, the STSA 
advanced the principle that one “who was called to the colors 
was not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence 
from his civilian job.” Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair 
Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946).  
 
As active conflicts continued to summon Americans to 
service,4 Congress responded. The Selective Service Act of 
19485 bolstered employment rights for veterans by 
 
 2 Selective Serv. Sys., Historical Timeline, https://ww
w.sss.gov/history-and-records/timeline/ (last visited August 3, 
2021); The Nat’l WWII Museum, Research Starters: The 
Draft and World War II, https://www.nationalww2museum.or
g/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/draft-
and-wwii (last visited August 3, 2021). 
 3 Susan M. Gates et al., Supporting Employers in the 
Reserve Operational Forces Era app. A at 1–2 
(2013), https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtm0.7. 
 4 Historical Timeline, supra note 2. 
 5 Before the Selective Service Act re-enacted the STSA, 




guaranteeing a servicemember any position “he would have 
enjoyed if he had continued in such employment continuously 
from the time of his entering the armed forces until the time of 
his restoration to such employment.” Pub. L. No. 759, 
§ 9(c)(2), 62 Stat. 604, 616. But the entitlement to benefits 
remained unchanged. See id. § 9(c)(1), 62 Stat. at 615. Then, 
“[i]n 1951, in order to strengthen the Nation’s Reserve Forces, 
Congress extended reinstatement rights to employees returning 
from training duty” in the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 555 
(1981); Pub. L. No. 51, § 1(s), 65 Stat. 75, 86–86 (1951). 
Additional protections followed over the next decade as 
Congress included short term leave for military obligations of 
less than three years. Pub. L. No. 86-632, § 1 para. 3, 74 Stat. 
467, 467 (1960) (protecting an employee’s “return to his 
position with such seniority, status, pay, and vacation as he 
would have had if he had not been absent for such purposes”); 
see also Monroe, 452 U.S. at 555. 
 
“The end of the Vietnam War provided the need and the 
opportunity to revisit the protections and benefits granted to 
returning service members.”6 In response, Congress enacted 
USERRA’s immediate predecessor, the Veterans’ 
Reemployment Rights Act (“VRRA”) as part of the Vietnam 
Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974. Pub. L. 
No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578. Among other provisions, the VRRA 
entitled veterans, including reservists, to “like seniority, status, 
 
for reemployment after relief from training or service. Pub. L. 
No. 473, § 1, 58 Stat. 798, 798 (1944). Congress then extended 
the law in 1945 with minor amendments and without change to 
section 8. Pub. L. No. 54, 59 Stat. 166, 166–67 (1945). 
 6 Gates et al., supra note 3, app. A at 4. 
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and pay” when returning to civilian work, as well as the ability 
to “participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the 
employer[.]” Id. § 404(a), 88 Stat. at 1595.  
 
Finally, in 1994, Congress enacted USERRA to replace 
the VRRA. Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994). 
Containing “the most expansive protection [to 
servicemembers] yet enacted,”7 USERRA crystalized the 
language Travers and FedEx dispute, entitling reservists and 
other military personnel to certain employment benefits while 
on leave. To that text we next turn. 
 
2. Text, Not Labels  
 
Two of USERRA’s provisions are at issue: 
§ 4316(b)(1), which entitles employees taking military leave to 
the “other rights and benefits” their employers give to 
employees taking similar kinds of leave; and § 4303(2), which 
defines those “other rights and benefits.”  
 
Section 4316(b)(1) provides:  
 
 
 7 Daniel J. Bugbee, Employers Beware: Violating 
USERRA through Improper Pre-Employment Inquiries, 12 
Chap. L. Rev. 279, 281 (2008). By superseding the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Monroe, USERRA also made it easier for 
a veteran to show a claim for employment discrimination. 
Compare Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559 
(1981) (discrimination must be “motivated solely by reserve 
status”), with 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (discrimination based on 
reserve status can be “a motivating factor”). 
9 
 
[A] person who is absent from a position of 
employment by reason of service in the 
uniformed services shall be— 
 
(A) deemed to be on furlough or leave of 
absence while performing such service; and 
 
(B) entitled to such other rights and 
benefits not determined by seniority as are 
generally provided by the employer of the person 
to employees having similar seniority, status, 
and pay who are on furlough or leave of absence 
under a contract, agreement, policy, practice, or 
plan in effect at the commencement of such 
service or established while such person 
performs such service. 
 
38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 4303(2) 
defines “rights and benefits”: 
 
The term “benefit”, “benefit of employment”, or 
“rights and benefits” means the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
including any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, 
status, account, or interest (including wages or 
salary for work performed) that accrues by 
reason of an employment contract or agreement 
or an employer policy, plan, or practice and 
includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, 
a health plan, an employee stock ownership plan, 
insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, 
severance pay, supplemental unemployment 
10 
 
benefits, vacations, and the opportunity to select 
work hours or location of employment. 
 
Id. § 4303(2). How are these guarantees best read?8 
 
 Start with § 4316(b)(1). It adopts a simple formula: 
employees who take military leave from their jobs must receive 
the same “rights and benefits” provided to employees absent 
for other reasons. And on that much, the parties agree. They 
part ways on how to describe the “right or benefit” Travers 
wants, a disagreement that veers away from the text of 
USERRA. Travers argues that the benefit is “paid leave,” a 
“shorthand to describe ‘continu[ing] to receive pay while 
absent from work.’” (Reply Br. at 9 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Opening Br. at 2).) FedEx responds that the company 
never provides anyone “paid leave” generally. Rather, FedEx 
offers pay for certain specific kinds of time away from the job, 
such as “paid sick leave” or “paid jury-duty leave.” (Response 
Br. at 1.) What Travers seeks, FedEx says, is “paid military 
leave.” (Response Br. at 1–2.)  
 
 But the parties reduce the benefit to catchall labels that 
Congress did not write. The judicial power should not be used 
to create a shorthand guide to the words passed by both houses 
of Congress and presented to the President.9 Subsections (A) 
 
 
8 An issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit, which held 
that USERRA covers short-term paid military leave. See White 
v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2021). 
9 “We operate in a system of written law in which courts 
need not—and generally cannot—articulate the law in the first 




and (B) of § 4316(b)(1) create a comparison of the “rights and 
benefits” an employee is owed. The first group consists of 
employees “absent from a position of employment by reason 
of service in the uniformed services.” 38 U.S.C. 
§ 4316(b)(1)(A). The second is “employees having similar 
seniority, status, and pay who are on . . . leave of absence[.]” 
Id. § 4316(b)(1)(B). Both groups contain employees who are 
not at work, Group 1, for military service, Group 2, for 
anything else.  
 
 That is how we measure the rights and benefits: does 
Group 2 get something that Group 1 does not? See id. 
§ 4316(b)(1)(B) (“entitled to such other rights and 
benefits . . . as are generally provided by the employer . . . to 
employees having similar seniority, status, and pay who are on 
furlough or leave of absence . . . .”).10 Can that thing be the 
 
Powers’ in Congress); Art. 1, § 7 (describing the bicameralism 
and presentment process). The Constitution, federal statutes, 
and treaties are the law. . . .” Gamble v. United States, 139 S. 
Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). This modest 
task leaves us wary to advance a “judicial interpretation [based 
on labels that will invariably lead to] antecedent variations, 
[such that] from . . . five barley loaves and two fishes[,] five 
thousand lawyers [are] fed and there [will] remain[] twelve 
baskets of crumbs.” Burt v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 301 
F. Supp. 899, 900 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (citing Matthew 14:13–21). 
 10 A second comparison is beyond this appeal: whether 
military leave taken by Group 1 is comparable to the other 
types of leaves taken by Group 2. Travers alleges that his leave 




leave itself, the right and benefit to not come to work without 
facing adverse action? No, because the word “other”11 in 
§ 4316(b)(1)(B) means something distinct or different, and 
absence from the job is common to both employee groups. That 
“other” benefit could be most anything—say, health insurance, 
a bonus, or a gym membership. What matters is who gets that 
benefit. Something the employer offers to Group 2 but denies 
to Group 1 becomes the comparator for a USERRA differential 
treatment claim.   
 
 USERRA describes a process for evaluating alleged 
disparate treatment of servicemembers on military leave by an 
employer. It does not create a class of rights and benefits. In 
other words, this is not a dispute about whether USERRA 
guarantees “paid leave” or “paid military leave.” Instead, it is 
a quarrel over whether § 4316(b)(1) allows Travers to allege 
that FedEx extends a right and benefit in the form of pay to the 
group of employees who miss work for non-military reasons, 
but then denies pay to the group absent for military service. 
 
FedEx provides to non-military employees. Whether FedEx 
offers a type of leave comparable to military leave is for the 
District Court to determine on remand. See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 1002.150 (2021).  
 11 When Congress enacted USERRA, “other” meant 
“being the one or ones distinct from that or those first 
mentioned or implied.” Other, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (10th ed. 1993); see also Other, Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Abridged (1993) (“being the ones distinct from the one or those 
first mentioned or understood—used with a plural noun . . . not 
the same: different.”). 
13 
 
Framing the issue using the text of USERRA, without resorting 
to extra-textual labels, avoids introducing ambiguities or, 
worse, creating a new set of rights and benefits outside of “the 
prescription for legislative action” in the Constitution and “the 
Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal 
government be exercised in accord with a single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 
3. “Paid Military Leave” Is Not the Best Reading 
 
What of FedEx’s preferred characterization, styled 
“paid military leave”? (Response Br. at 4.) The argument has 
two parts, neither satisfactory, for it tries to read into USERRA 
a requirement absent from the text.  
 
First, FedEx says Travers’s benefit must be a “specific 
type[] of leave,” such as “paid military leave,” because 
USERRA does not reach “generic benefit[s].” (Response Br. at 
25, 27; Supp. Ltr. at 1.) That is sort of true, because a plaintiff 
must show that something has been given to a group of 
employees not serving in the military that is denied to the 
military group. But that does not mean USERRA only reaches 
specific benefits. The text makes that clear, referring to 
benefits that are “generally provided by the employer.” 38 
U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B). Reading “generally” to require 
“specifically” stretches the text not just beyond a best 
construction, but outside ordinary understanding. 
 
Second (though it is really just more of the first), FedEx 
says there is nothing denied to any employee group because 
nobody in Group 2 is offered the benefit of “paid military 
leave.” There is logic to that conclusion as well because, as 
14 
 
explained, an employer does not violate the protections in 
USERRA by denying a right and benefit equally to all 
employee groups. FedEx’s math is the problem, as it needs to 
slip in the adjective “military” to make the calculation work. 
Section 4316(b)(1)(B) supplies the right formula, giving 
employees taking military leave benefits that are “generally 
provided by the employer to employees having similar 
seniority, status, and pay who are on furlough or leave of 
absence.” (emphasis added). That rules out illusory benefits 
that exist in theory, not practice. Since employers cannot 
“provide” military leave, paid or otherwise, to non-military 
employees, there is no way to deny the benefit in a neutral way.  
 
Third, adopting the definition proposed by FedEx could 
undermine the larger statutory scheme, because a court must 
separately compare the types of leave for sufficient 
similarity.12 Shoehorning the label given to the leave into the 
definition of the benefit avoids making the actual comparison 
between different types of leave.13 
 
 12 A point explained at supra note 10. 
 
13 Judge Shwartz agrees that there are two groups, 
military employees and non-military employees, and that 
USERRA ensures that military employees receive the same 
benefits as similarly situated non-military employees but does 
not see separate groups being created by the language of 
subsections (A) and (B) themselves. Judge Shwartz sees 
subsections (A) and (B) as providing two different things, as 
indicated by the words “shall be deemed” before the provision 
that discusses how an employee should be categorized while 




All this means § 4316(b)(1) allows Travers to state a 
claim for entitlement to the benefit of pay while on leave. But 
recall that § 4302(2) defines “rights and benefits.” So Travers’s 
job does not end here, and he must also show that the pay non-
military employees receive while on leave is one of the “rights 
and benefits” defined by § 4303(2).  
 
B. Pay During Leave Is a “Right and Benefit” under 
 USERRA § 4303(2) 
 
We turn next to § 4303(2), which defines “rights and 
benefits” under USERRA: 
 
The term “benefit”, “benefit of employment”, or 
“rights and benefits” means the terms, 
 
the person should receive. More specifically, she sees 
subsection (A) as providing that a person who is absent from 
work due to military service should be treated as if the person 
is on furlough or on a leave of absence. This language ensures 
that a person who is absent from work due to military 
commitments is not deemed to have quit or abandoned his or 
her job. Judge Shwartz sees subsection (B) as providing a 
different protection, namely that military employees are 
entitled to the same benefits as similarly situated non-military 
employees. The two subsections are joined by the word “and,” 
which conveys that a person who is serving in the military is 
entitled to both. While Judge Shwartz reads this part of the 
statute differently from her colleagues, she agrees with the 
conclusion that, under USERRA, those serving in the military 
are entitled to the same benefits as similarly situated co-
workers who are not serving. 
16 
 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
including any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, 
status, account, or interest (including wages or 
salary for work performed) that accrues by 
reason of an employment contract or agreement 
or an employer policy, plan, or practice and 
includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, 
a health plan, an employee stock ownership plan, 
insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, 
severance pay, supplemental unemployment 
benefits, vacations, and the opportunity to select 
work hours or location of employment. 
 
38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). Again, we determine the best ordinary 
meaning of these terms when enacted.  
 
1. The Words at the Beginning of the Definition  
  Are Broad 
 
Begin with the words “terms,” “conditions,” and 
“privileges,”14 all of which modify “employment.”15 Section 
 
 14 The Hire Heroes Act of 2011 added the phrase “terms, 
conditions, or privileges” to the definition. Pub. L. No. 112-56, 
§ 251, 125 Stat. 711, 729. This amendment superseded the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Carder v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 636 
F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2011), which held that the definition’s 
absence of the words “terms, conditions, or privileges” meant 
that plaintiffs could not establish a hostile work environment 
claim under USERRA § 4311(a). 
 15 No mysterious meanings lurk here. “Term” is a 




4303(2) then defines the kinds of “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” as “including any advantage, profit, 
privilege, gain, status, account, or interest (including wages or 
salary for work performed).” Id. § 4303(2). The words “any” 
and “including” mean the list explains, without exhausting.16  
 
The ordinary understanding of the words in the list 
easily reaches a wide range of benefits, including payment 
during leave. See, e.g., Advantage, Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993) (“superiority of position 
or condition . . . [b]enefit, gain; esp: benefit resulting from 
 
agreement reached; stipulated or agreed-upon requirements[.]” 
Term, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010). 
“Condition” is “the state of affairs that must exist or be brought 
about before something else is possible or permitted[.]” 
Condition, id. And “privilege” is “a special right, advantage, or 
immunity granted or available only to a particular person or 
group of people.” Privilege, id. 
 16 A point repeated often by the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2019) 
(“Congress’ use of the word ‘any’ suggests an intent to use that 
term expansively.” (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted)); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 
142, 162 (2012) (“Any” and “including” are broad words and 
“make[] clear that the examples enumerated in the text are 
intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.”); Bloate v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 196, 207 (2010) (“Including” is “an expansive 
or illustrative term.”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 
214, 219 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, 




some course of action”); Profit, id. (“a valuable return . . . [n]et 
income usu. for a given period of time”); Gain, id. (“resources 
or advantage acquired or increased: profit”). FedEx pays 
employees who take non-military leaves for jury duty, 
bereavement, and health, placing employees taking leave for 
military service at a disadvantage. Naturally, pay is an 
“increase in resources” and a “valuable return” for non-
military employees. And that ordinary meaning is confirmed 
by ordinary practice: human resource guides and manuals 
confirm that pay for leave matched the plain understanding of 




 17 See HR Practitioners Guide, Schedules and Leave, 
Leave § 625.10 (Bloomberg Law 2021) (“Most employers that 
provide paid leave view the benefit as a tool that helps attract 
and retain employees . . . [it] protect[s] employees from 
income or job loss . . . [and] also gives employees time to 
handle family emergencies, doctors’ appointments and other 
matters that might interfere with work performance.”); Guide 
to Collective Bargaining, Leave Programs § 140 (Bloomberg 
Law 2021) (Leave “provisions generally allow employees to 
take time off work when needed for various purposes without 
the employee having to worry about the loss of employment 
or, in many cases, the loss of pay.”); HR Series Policies and 
Practices, Leaves of Absence, Reasons for Offering Leave 
§ 207:2 (Westlaw 2016) (“Many employers offer more leave 
than is legally required, finding that time off benefits can 




2. The Parenthetical Is Not Restrictive 
 
FedEx and the District Court point to the parenthetical 
at the end of this list—“(including wages or salary for work 
performed).” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). The District Court reasoned 
that “[b]y explicitly providing ‘rights and benefits’ includes 
‘wages or salary for work performed,’ Congress, by negative 
implication, excluded wages or salary for work not performed, 
such as paid leave.” (App. at 16 (first and third emphases 
added).) But this is not the best reading given the law’s history 
and its broad language.   
 
As originally written, the parenthetical read “(other 
than wages for work performed).” § 2(a), 108 Stat. at 3150 
(emphasis added). Congress later replaced “other than” with 
the word “including.” Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-275, § 701(a), 124 Stat. 2864, 2887. That makes all 
the difference. Rather than constricting the types of benefits, 
the new language expanded the definition.18 Given the history, 
we will not read in what Congress has taken out.19  
 
 18 The expanded definition reached claims for 
discrimination based on wage under USERRA § 4311, which 
had been unavailable to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Sprint 
Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 853 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 19 The negative-implication canon requires particularly 
careful application and “applies only when circumstances 
support a sensible inference that the term left out must have 
been meant to be excluded.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
929, 940 (2017) (cleaned up); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 





3. The List of Examples at the End of the Definition 
  
Turn, at last, to the final clause in the definition20 
providing another list of example benefits that “include[] rights 
and benefits under a pension plan, a health plan, an employee 
stock ownership plan, insurance coverage and awards, 
bonuses, severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, 
vacations, and the opportunity to select work hours or location 
of employment.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). Humming a familiar 
refrain, FedEx argues that paid leave is too general, the 
statutory list too specific. For variation, it grabs on to the word 
“vacation,” arguing that it and paid leave cannot both be 
benefits (since vacation is a subset of paid leave). Inconsistent? 
Our goal is not perfect harmony, only the best estimation of the 
words written by Congress. And the common understanding of 
the examples selected paints a broad understanding that 
includes pay while on leave. 
 
 
expressio unius canon does not apply unless it is fair to suppose 
that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to 
say no to it.” (cleaned up)).  
 20 The intermediate clause “that accrues by reason of an 
employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, 
plan, or practice” offers no difficulty. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2). 
“Accrue” is defined as “to come into existence as an 
enforceable claim: vest as a right.” Accrue, Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary of Law (1996). So pay while on leave must vest in 
an employment agreement, policy, plan, or practice. FedEx’s 
employment policy satisfies this requirement. 
21 
 
Consider just a few examples. “Insurance coverage” 
includes more specific benefits such as life insurance, health 
insurance, and sickness and accident insurance.21 How about 
 
 21 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. 
Stats., Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – March 
1994, at 21 (June 16, 1994), https://www.bls.gov/news.releas
e/archives/ecec_031994.pdf. Similarly, BLS’s Employee 
Benefits Survey from 1993–1994 designated “insurance” as a 
larger category of more specific benefits that also included 
“sickness and accident insurance,” “long-term disability 
insurance,” “medical care,” “dental care,” and “life insurance.” 
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., 
BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in Small Private Industry 
Establishments, 1994 (September 14, 1995), https://www.bls.
gov/news.release/history/ebs_091495.txt; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., BLS Reports on 
Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private 
Establishments, 1993 (September 30, 1994), https://www.bls.
gov/news.release/history/ebs_093094.txt; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., BLS Reports on 
Employee Benefits in State and Local Governments, 1994 
(September 14, 1995), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/histo
ry/ebs2_091495.txt. BLS’s Employment Cost Index analyzed 
data collected from 23,000 occupations in private industry and 
state and local government. Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation – March 1994, supra, at 21. And the Employee 
Benefits Survey, which collected information on employer-
provided benefit plans, was “a major source of information for 




“a health plan?” In 1994, the term referred to a host of 
insurance coverage22 ranging from fee-for-service, health 
maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, 
and exclusive provider organizations, each varying in the types 
of benefits provided.23 So too a “pension plan,” meaning both 
 
comparison of their benefits plans with prevailing practices.” 
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., Bulletin 2414, BLS 
Handbook of Methods, at 72 (1992).  
 22 Michael Bucci & Robert Grant, Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance: What’s Offered; What’s Chosen?, Monthly 
Lab. Rev., October 1995, at 38–44, 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1995/10/art6full.pdf (using 
“health care plans” and “health insurance” interchangeably 
when analyzing BLS data of employer-offered health plans 
from 1992–1993); see also Laura A. Scofea, The Development 
and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, Monthly 
Lab. Rev., March 1994, at 3–10, 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1994/03/art1full.pdf. 
 23 BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in Small Private 
Industry Establishments, 1994, supra note 21; BLS Reports on 
Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private 
Establishments, 1993, supra note 21; BLS Reports on 
Employee Benefits in State and Local Governments, 1994, 
supra note 21; see also Bucci & Grant, supra note 22, at 40 tbl. 
2; Employee Benefit Research Institute, Fundamentals of 
Employee Benefit Programs 221–49 (5th ed. 1997). 
23 
 
a subset of retirement benefits and a general category of 
plans.24  
 
 24 See BLS Handbook of Methods, supra note 21, at 57 
(For purposes of the Employment Cost Index, BLS grouped 
“pension and retirement benefits” and “savings and thrift 
plans” under the greater category “pension and savings 
plans”); BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in Medium and 
Large Private Establishments, 1993, supra note 21 (including 
“defined benefit pension” as a subcategory of “retirement”); 
BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in Small Private Industry 
Establishments, 1994, supra note 21; BLS Reports on 
Employee Benefits in State and Local Governments, 1994, 
supra note 21. Pensions refer to defined benefit or defined 
contribution plans. BLS Reports on Employee Benefits in 
Small Private Industry Establishments, 1994, supra note 21 
(“Defined benefit plans characteristically specify a formula for 
determining an employee annuity at retirement. Alternatively, 
defined contribution plans specify the employer’s 
contributions, but do not predetermine the actual retirement 
dollar benefit.”); Fundamentals of Employee Benefit 
Programs, supra note 23, at 56–57; William J. Wiatrowski, On 
the Disparity Between Private and Public Pensions, Monthly 
Lab. Rev., April 1994, at 5 n.7, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr
/1994/04/art1full.pdf (“Earnings-based defined benefit 
pension plans [were] the most prevalent among white-collar 
workers . . .[but] [t]he presence of a large proportion of blue-
collar and service workers in the private sector [led] to a variety 




It all tells the same story: Congress enacted a broad 
definition encompassing a wide range of benefits illustrated, 
not exhausted, by a list of examples. Nor does the expansion of 
employee benefits in the decades since 1994 change that 
reading, because “[w]hile every statute’s meaning is fixed at 
the time of enactment, new applications may arise in light of 
changes in the world.” Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074. 
Congress addressed that evolution by including a definition 
that varies in levels of specificity and generality. The result is 
that “rights and benefits” under USERRA § 4303(2) includes 
pay while on leave.25 
 
 25 The codified statutory purposes of USERRA support 
this reading. See 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a). Interpreting the 
definition of “rights and benefits” under USERRA 
§ 4316(b)(1) broadly to include pay while on leave advances 
the core purpose of “minimizing the disadvantages to civilian 
careers and employment which can result from such service.” 
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1). FedEx’s policy of paying employees 
on non-military leaves but not those on military leaves directly 
disadvantages those who take military leave. And any 
interpretive doubt is construed in favor of the service member, 
under the pro-veteran canon. See, e.g., Gordon, 388 F.3d at 81 
(This Court “construe[s] USERRA’s provisions liberally, in 
favor of the service member.”); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 
561, 575 (1943) (“The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 
is always to be liberally construed to protect those who have 
been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of 
the nation.”); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 
328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (The STSA “is to be liberally 




4. The Specific-General Canon Is Inapplicable 
 
Finally, we see no conflict between USERRA and 
5 U.S.C. § 6323(a), a law first enacted in 1917 providing 
fifteen days of paid military leave for federal government 
employees. Drawing on the specific-general canon, the District 
Court reasoned that 5 U.S.C. § 6323, the more specific statute, 
would be rendered superfluous by finding that USERRA 
entitled Travers to pay for his military leave. 
  
There is no need to reach for the specific-general canon, 
a tool that helps courts reconcile conflicting statutory 
provisions when “no permissible meaning can eliminate the 
conflict.” Garner & Scalia, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 183 (2012); see also RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC 
v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012). “Where there 
is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be 
controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the 
priority of enactment.” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 
U.S. 148, 153 (1976)) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535, 550–51 (1974)). In other words, where a statute does “not 
expressly contradict[] the original act, [it] shall not be 
considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive 
previous provisions, unless it is absolutely necessary to give 
the latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall 
have any meaning at all.” Id. (quoting T. Sedgwick, The 
 
their country in its hour of great need.”); King v. St. Vincent’s 
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991) (“[W]e would ultimately 
read the provision in King’s favor under the canon that 
provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are 
to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.”).  
26 
 
Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional 
Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)). 
 
That is this case here, because reading USERRA 
§ 4316(b)(1) to include pay during leave does not contradict, 
negate, or nullify 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a). Section 6323(a) provides 
a fifteen-day floor of paid military leave for government 
employees. This floor is more generous than other federal non-
military leaves, such as sick leave. See 5 U.S.C. § 6307(a) 
(federal government employees are entitled to thirteen days of 
paid sick leave). In other words, 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a) is not 
nullified because it provides additional benefits to 




FedEx allegedly pays employees for some leave but 
declines to compensate Travers for leave taken to serve his 
country. That states a claim under USERRA, a statute with a 
long history of protecting the jobs and accompanying benefits 
of Americans called to our common defense. Best understood, 
USERRA does not allow employers to treat servicemembers 
differently by paying employees for some kinds of leave while 
exempting military service. So we will vacate and remand the 
District Court’s grant of FedEx’s motion to dismiss. 
 
 26 If a factfinder saw a comparable leave (a point 
discussed at supra note 10) granting more than fifteen days of 
pay by statute, that could trigger a different analysis. But 
FedEx offers no such example, and we are aware of none. 
Should the hypothetical become reality, Congress remains free 
to rebalance the scales. In the meantime, we need not rewrite 
USERRA to knock back theoretical concerns. 
